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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE:
CONTESTATION AND SETTLEMENT
Susan Sell*
The history of intellectual property protection reveals a complex
yet identifiable relationship between three major factors. First, it
reveals shifting conceptions of ownership, authorship, and invention.
These ideas denote what "counts" as property, and who shall lay
claim to it. Second, this history reflects changes in the organization
of innovation and the production and distribution of technology.
Third, it reflects institutional change with these shifting ideational
and material forces.
Legal institutionalization of these changes in law alters power
relationships and inevitably privileges some at the expense of others.
Property rights both are situated within broader historical structures
of global capitalism and serve to either reproduce or transform these
structures. Particular historical structures privilege some agents over
others, and these agents can appeal to institutions to increase their
power.
Depending on the world in which one lives, piracy may be
construed as theft or as an important tool of public policy. Whether
one is talking about books or drugs, movies or software, the
definition of what constitutes property depends upon time, place,
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AND ANTITRUST (1998) as well as numerous articles and book chapters on the
politics of intellectual property. Thanks to Peter Yu for organizing this
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geography, constellation of interests, degree of competition present,
stage of economic development, and power. Insofar as intellectual
property is an instrument of public policy, all of these factors are
relevant.
Historical change is not linear. It is contingent, rife with
unintended consequences, path dependence, and awkward patches in
which institutions no longer serve their original aims. Essentially,
the history of intellectual property rights is a history of contestation.
The inherent tensions in the idea of intellectual property recurrently
resurface under philosophical, technological, or institutional
pr.essure. This Article highlights several key moments in the
development of intellectual property law when particular ideas and
economic circumstances converged to privilege particular agents and
alter institutions. It offers a critical history of intellectual property
rights and suggests that the contemporary arrangements of very high
standards of intellectual property protection are neither the most
desirable nor the only possible arrangements.
The Article first presents ideas about property to highlight the
inherent tensions between romantic and utilitarian justifications of
property rights. It goes on to identify and discuss key moments of
contestation and settlement in the evolution of intellectual property
policy. Beginning with late eighteenth century Britain, the story of
Richard Arkwright highlights contestation between patentees and
users of patented technologies. ' In this instance, users prevailed over
patentees.
2
The Article goes on to describe the diversity of intellectual
property law in the nineteenth century, demonstrating the many ways
in which different countries used intellectual property policies to
encourage economic development. Next, the Article highlights a key
settlement in the history of intellectual property law and international
trade: the resolution of the patent controversy of 1870-1875 in favor
of intellectual property rights. The next section discusses the
multilateral institutionalization of this resolution in the Paris and
Berne Conventions. The following section discusses Thomas Edison
and his use of patents as a business strategy. Next the Article
examines the ascendance of the German chemical industry through
1. See BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., MORAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH, AND OTHER ESSAYS 19-20 (1998).
2. See id.
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employment of a new business model, and the rise of patent cartels.
The subsequent section explores twentieth century American
ambivalence and the evolution of the American position from
skepticism about intellectual property protection and monopoly
power to vigorous advocacy for dramatically expanded global
property rights. The final section briefly discusses the recent
multilateral intellectual property settlement in the World Trade
Organization and the emerging contestation in its wake.
I. IDEAS ABOUT PROPERTY
Competing perspectives on balancing private and public goods
inform the notion of intellectual property. While there are numerous
justifications for intellectual property,3 a central tension is the one
between romantic notions of authorship and invention4 on the one
hand, and utilitarian conceptions of incentives for creation and
diffusion on the other.5 Romantic notions endorse the doctrine of
natural rights in one's own creation as private, subjective, expressive,
and perpetual, while utilitarian theory promotes dissemination to the
public, the objective nature of knowledge, competition, and limits on
rights.6 As Professor Carla Hesse points out, these two ideas
emerged most prominently in Europe during the eighteenth century
as
[i]ncreasing literacy and the emergence of a large middle-
class readership throughout Europe in the first half of the
eighteenth century put unprecedented strains upon a system
of publication that had been predicated on the notion that
3. See generally PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY (1996) (addressing the justifications for intellectual property law
found in common law judicial decisions); CHRISTOPHER MAY, A GLOBAL
ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: THE NEW ENCLOSURES?
(2000) (arguing that there are three groups of justifications, called
"justificatory schemata," used to support the institution of intellectual
property).
4. The inventor image is more rationalist than romantic, but both notions
elevate the stature of the "creator." For more on the heroic image of the
inventor, see Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private
Intellectual Property and the Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
191,215-16 (1994).
5. Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property: 700 B. C.-A.D. 2000: An
Idea in the Balance, DAEDALUS, Spring 2002, at 26, 36-37.
6. Id. at 34-36.
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there was a fixed amount of divine or ancient knowledge to
be known, transmitted, and interpreted.7
The huge demand for literature prompted many people to earn their
living as writers. 8 To do so, however, writers needed to obtain
adequate remuneration for their products.9 The demand for books
also prompted printers to produce cheap reprints, or "pirate editions."
These individuals promoted themselves as "champions of the 'public
interest' against the monopolistic members of book guilds."'10
In 1710 Daniel Defoe expressed a romantic notion of authorship
by writing, "'A Book is the Author's Property, 'tis the Child of his
Inventions, the Brat of his Brain.... ,,,11 Later in the century,
British, French, and German commentators on the literary enterprise
further developed the notion of an author's works as "unique,
perpetual, and inviolable property."'12 Influenced by John Locke's
"sweat of the brow" "labor-desert" theory of property, British .poet
Edward Young offered a secularized theory of knowledge.13 In his
1759 treatise, Conjectures on Original Composition, Young wrote
that "[t]he individual personality supplanted God as the divine font
of knowledge." 14
Due to its wide circulation, Young's book became highly
influential in continental Europe. 15  While Young argued that
products of the mind deserved greater protection than mechanical
inventions, the French encyclopedist Denis Diderot argued in 1763
that literary property is even more uniquely the property of its
creator than land acquired through cultivation. 16  The German
Enlightenment writer Gotthold Lessing, in his 1772 essay, Live and
Let Live, "challenged directly the traditional ban on profits received
from writing," causing subsequent German writers to seek
7. Id. at 31-32.
8. Id. at 32.
9. See id.
10. Id.
11. Id. (quoting Daniel Defoe).
12. Id. at 34.
13. See id. at 33. For more on Locke's "sweat of the brow" and "labor
desert" theories, see also Richard A. Spinello, Web Site Linking: Right
or Privilege § 5 (June 4-5, 1999), available at http://www.linksandlaw.com/
legalresources-publicationsenglish.htm.




recognition for "their claims upon their writings as a form of unique,
perpetual, and inviolable property."'
7
A generation later, philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte grappled
with the nature of immaterial property and concluded that what gave
such goods the imprimatur of "property" was not the ideas
themselves, but rather the distinguishing quality of the "unique
'form' in which an author chose to express these ideas."18 Thus the
ideas/expression dichotomy that has anchored copyright was born.
"Fichte's distinctions.., were to be critical in establishing a new
theory of copyright based on the natural right to property in the
unique expression of ideas, rather than in the ideas themselves."
'1 9
Some analysts rejected the effort to secure authors' copyrights
as nothing more than an attempt to preserve the book publishers'
20monopolies. In 1776, responding to Diderot's Letter on the Book
Trade, French mathematician and philosopher Marie Jean Condorcet
rejected the notion of literary property as a right, and instead argued
that it was a privilege.21  Condorcet argued that ideas are not
produced by individuals alone, but "are intrinsically social: ... the
fruit of a collective process of experience.
22
Sir Isaac Newton's famous quote captures this idea: "'If I have
seen far, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants.' 23 Condorcet
also argued that granting exclusive property rights over literary
property would have pernicious effects.24 He wrote, "'[p]rivileges of
this sort, like all others, are inconveniences that diminish activity by
concentrating it in a small number of hands .... They are neither
necessary nor useful, and... they are unjust."' 25 Condorcet
developed a doctrine rooted in social utility, in which "knowledge
was obective and thus fundamentally social in character, belonging
to all." 6
17. Id.
18. Id. at 35.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 36.
22. Id.
23. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, at 29.




LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:267
Social utilitarianism became a competing legal doctrine to the
subjectivist notions of universal natural rights in one's intellectual
creations.27 These competing doctrines embody the tensions inherent
in intellectual property rights. As a matter of public policy,
utilitarian notions are designed to reward creation and diffusion.
28
Natural rights or romantic notions privilege the goal of stewardship,
or the right to "manage" one's property after it is created.29
Professor Mark Lemley usefully contrasts these conceptions as
"ex ante" in the case of the utilitarian/public goods or
incentive/public goods justification, and "ex post" in the
romantic/private reward justification.30  Under the incentive/public
goods justification, "like other 'monopolies,' patents and copyrights
were dangerous devices that should be deployed only when
absolutely necessary to advance some clear public interest."
31
Advocates of the romantic/private reward justification argue that
"extended intellectual property rights were necessary to give existing
copyright owners an incentive to preserve [the works] they had
already... created. 32  Under this view "the optimal right would
appear to be perpetual: if only ownership gives efficient incentives
to use, the right of stewardship of a film or an invention should never
end."33 These apparent philosophical differences have obvious and
sharp policy ramifications. Professor Lemley identifies the ex post
justifications as being profoundly anti-market.
34
Intellectual property protection always has been a form of public
policy. Since the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, this policy often
focused on technology transfer and diffusion.35 States have relied on
three primary methods for accomplishing this goal: incentives,
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 36-37.
30. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for
Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 129, 129 (2004).
31. William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual Property: A
History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United States 20 (1999), at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf.
32. Lemley, supra note 30, at 134.
33. Id. at 135.
34. See id. at 148-49.
35. P.J. Federico, The Origin of Patents, 11 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 292, 293
(1929).
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working requirements and compulsory licensing.36 In the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries, patents were grants of privilege awarded to
those who brought new techniques into a sovereign's territory.37 For
example, British kings awarded letters of protection to the Flemish
weavers, and in 1440, to John Shiedame, for introducing a salt-
making process. 38 Inspired by the mercantilist goals of limiting
imports and promoting exports, rulers sought to attract and retain
talented artisans in their territory.39 Working requirements, which
require patentees to work the invention or process in the territory
granting the patent, are provisions designed to promote technology
transfer and the diffusion of innovation. 40  Another mechanism
established to promote technology transfer is compulsory licensing,
which permits the government to seize a patentee's product or
process. 41 The diversity of intellectual property policies between
countries is partly a function of their different stages of development.
All other things being equal (which they never are), a technological
leader will prefer strong protection of its innovations, whereas a
follower will favor access over protection.42
The development of intellectual property legislation, first at the
national and then at the international level, has been subject to the
continued mobilization of interests to establish and reinforce
positions of economic advantage. 43 The historical picture reveals a
recurrent tension that has not always been resolved in favor of
property holders. Even in the United States, the most aggressive




39. See Frank D. Prager, A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to
1787,26 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 711, 721-23 (1944).
40. Biswajit Dhar, The Convention on Biological Diversity and the TRIPS
Agreement: Compatibility or Conflict?, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE:
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 77, 84
(Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003).
41. Id.
42. Hesse, supra note 5, at 40 (discussing copyright); MICHAEL J.
TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
309-10 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing patents).
43. Susan K. Sell & Christopher May, Moments in Law: Contestation and
Settlement in the History of Intellectual Property, 8 REV. INT'L POL. ECON.
467, 470 (2001).
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"public-regarding" conception prevailed for much of the twentieth
century.44 Examining a number of "swings of the pendulum"
between public-regarding approaches and private protection reveals
the fundamentally political nature of intellectual property regulation
and provides an historical basis for alternative possibilities in the
future.
Given the distributional consequences of the ability to own and
control technological innovations, intellectual property frequently
has served as an instrument of power and, once captured, the basis
for further accumulation of power.45 Unlike power that comes from
controlling scarce material resources, however, intellectual property
holders have had to construct the scarcity of property through legal
instruments.46  The very process of defining what constitutes
intellectual property effectively reinforces "particular perspectives
that may benefit some at the expense of others, 'A7 rendering some
creations "property" and others "freely" available.4 8  Indeed,
asymmetrical economic power goes a long way toward explaining
why semiconductor chips are identified as intellectual property
whereas indigenous folklore is not.
49
This Article offers a critical history of intellectual property as an
alternative to both realist and functionalist analyses. Realism
44. CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
A CRITICAL HISTORY (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 40, on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
45. Cf Sell & May, supra note 43, at 469-73 (explaining that a critical
approach to intellectual property acknowledges the power of private actors,
and recognizes that the interests of the powerful are often enhanced at the
expense of others).
46. See Christopher May, Thinking, Buying, Selling: Intellectual Property
Rights in Political Economy, 3 NEW POL. ECON. 59, 69-70 (1998).
47. A. Claire Cutler et al., The Contours and Significance of Private
Authority in International Affairs, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 347 (A. Clair Cutler et al. eds., 1999).
48. See Peter Drahos, Indigenous Knowledge and the Duties of Intellectual
Property Owners, 11 INTELL. PROP. J. 179, 194-98 (1997).
49. See id.
50. Here, "realist" refers to international political economy theories and not
to Legal Realism. See generally STEPHEN KRASNER, STRUCTURAL CONFLICT:
THE THIRD WORLD AGAINST GLOBAL LIBERALISM (1985) (arguing, from a
modified realist approach, that conflicts between developed and third world
countries result from an asymmetrical balance of political power); JOHN
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS (2003) (offering
"offensive realism" as an approach to understanding the history of
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emphasizes state power and its distribution across the international
system as primary explanatory variables. 51 Realism takes power
seriously but suffers from its statist orientation, treating the state as a
unitary actor with well-defined interests. 52  Realism, therefore,
focuses too narrowly on the state as legislator. As a result, realism
provides limited leverage in the intellectual property context because
private actors, rather than states, have frequently prompted changes
in intellectual property protection.53 Both realism and functionalism
provide undifferentiated macro level accounts that obscure
significant variation; their explanations are indeterminate regarding
particular settlements. 54  Unlike realism, the perspective of this
Article is agnostic about the primary actors and suggests links
between the macro and micro levels.
Functionalist theories provide a completely different perspective
on the emergence and design of property rights.
Functionalist histories of property suggest that property
rights are established to promote efficiency in socio-
economic relations. Many functional histories are based on
the supposition that the institution of property emerged to
respond to the need for clear signaling in market relations.
Thus, as conflicts arose over scarce resources, the costs of
such conflicts outweighed the costs of establishing (and
policing) some sort of property regime. With shared rules
of property, social actors may dispense with the duplication
of effort required to constantly re-negotiate bilateral co-
ordination. In such accounts, therefore, the emergence of
international politics, how great international powers interact with one another,
and what lies ahead in great-power politics); KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL POLrrIcs (1979) (examining various theories of international
politics).
51. Stephen Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on
the Pareto Frontier, in 43 WORLD POL. 336, 336-66 (1991).
52. See generally SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE
DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1996) (arguing that the state-
market balance of power has shifted toward a market based on private global
integration rather than unitary state action).
53. See Tony Porter, Hegemony and the Private Governance of
International Industries, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, supra note 47, at 257, 258-59.
54. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 470.
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property serves a particular function: the efficient co-
ordination of economic activities.
55
Functionalism assumes that the forces and interests that have
played out in the contest over intellectual property have produced a
series of rational settlements, or improvements, that reflect the
political-economic context of the time or fulfill the needs of a
particular stage of industrial development.5 6 As Professor William
Fisher suggests:
Viewed from this angle, law seems to be superstructural-
its development driven by changes in the underlying mode
of production and associated relations of production. But
this is not the end of the story. To account fully for the
development of intellectual property law, one must also
take into account some cultural and ideological factors.
5 7
Indeed, while at first glance functionalism offers a plausible
approach to the evolution of intellectual property, "functionalist
theories beg the question of what constitutes efficiency and ignores
the issue of who defines it-efficiency for what, and for whom?
5 8
Functionalist theories attempt to explain efficiency in socio-
economic terms. A central issue for property rights is the
distribution of costs and benefits.5 9 Functional approaches address
the issues of internalization of external costs and benefits. 60 Property
owners seek to secure the benefits of the property while externalizing
the costs.6 1 The shifting balance of borne costs between property
holders and property users ultimately is a political question.
Although "[s]ocial efficiency might be best served by costs accruing
to the property that delivers the benefit[,] ... for individual owners it
is more 'efficient' to have the costs met by others." 62 The particular
definition of efficiency that guides policy depends upon the
distribution of political and economic power between owners and
55. Id. at 471.
56. Id.
57. Fisher, supra note 31, at 12 (internal citations omitted).
58. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 471.
59. Id.
60. Id.; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON.
REV., May 1967, at 347, 350.
61. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 471.
62. Id.
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users. 63  For example, is it the book "pirate" who promotes the
efficient distribution of printed matter, or is it the well-protected
romantic author or "Yankee genius" for whom the promise of the
security of her endeavor provides incentives to create and/or
preserve?
As demonstrated by the historical analysis that follows, the
answers to this question have varied over time depending upon the
particular constellations of state and market forces in championing
one conception of efficiency over another. At different historical
moments, particular state and market actors have defined social
efficiency as the public-regarding policy of dissemination and
64competition. At others, different constellations of state and market
actors have defined it as protection and exclusion to encourage
innovation.65 Theoretically, we can understand property rights in
terms of gains from coordination. Historically, however, "particular
property institutions emerged from far more diverse circumstances,
including the exercise of economic power, the impact of
technological change, and shifts in ideas about ownership."
66
When the resources required for social existence are scarce, the
distribution of property rights (essentially the right to use scarce
resources) becomes a central issue of political economy.
67
"However, for intellectual property such scarcity is neither
uncontested nor self-evident: the role of intellectual property is to
construct such scarcity in the realm of knowledge and to make it
legitimate." 68 The power of constructed scarcity lies in the power to
withhold property. However, this power can have negative social
consequences. History has shown that restricting access to
innovation can inhibit other inventors from improving existing




65. See id. at 471, 475-76.
66. Id. at 472.
67. Cf. KURT BURCH, "PROPERTY" AND THE MAKING OF THE
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1 (R.B.J. Walker ed., 1998) (noting that, in the
Seventeenth Century, property rights provided the "means and medium" to
legitimize a framework of distinct social realms, in which "[s]overeignty was
initially a property right of rulers").
68. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 472.
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For example, the history of steam-driven industrialization might
have been very different without Britain's eighteenth century,
incentive-based intellectual property policies. In 1789, the British
government awarded James Watt a patent for inventing the separate
condenser, a device that significantly improved the steam engine.
6 9
However, the patent discouraged the invention's widespread and
immediate dissemination. Further, Watt refused to license his
invention during both the original and renewal terms of his patents.
7 1
By doing so, he may have "held back the development of the
metalworking industry for over a generation. Had his monopoly
expired in 1783, England may have had railways much sooner.,
72
The imposed scarcity of this particular innovation halted its
dissemination and ossified its development until others could build
upon Watt's original insights. The public may still have benefited
from the patent by "encouraging" Watt's innovation in the first
place, but it is difficult to argue that Watt would not have invented
the separate condenser had he been unable to patent it.73 Certainly
however, society did not enoy the benefit of swift use and
deployment of this innovation.
7
69. See Christine MacLeod, Would There Have Been No Industrial
Revolution Without Patents? ESRC Research Seminar Series: Intellectual
Property Rights, Economic Development and Social Welfare: What Does
History Tell Us? 5 (April 26, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
70. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 472.
71. Six years after granting Watt's patent, the British Parliament renewed it
for an additional twenty-five years. Id.
72. AUGUSTIN-CHARLES RENOUARD, TRAITI DES BREVETS D'INVENTION
(1844).
73. Barrington Moore's analysis of "tinkers and inventors" such as James
Watt and Richard Arkwright counters Marxist and Weberian interpretations of
these men as greedy capitalists, arguing that they were motivated "to make
[their inventions] more reliable and efficient." MOORE, supra note 1, at 22-23.
Arkwright's fear of imitators led him to provide inadequate specifications in
filing his patent applications, thereby retarding the dissemination of patented
technology. Id. at 20. One of Arkwright's infringement suits resulted in the
cancellation of one of his patents, however, due to its alleged ambiguity. Id.
This in turn deterred Watt from pursuing infringement cases for fear of losing
his patents for being inadequately specified. See MacLeod, supra note 69, at 9.
74. This perspective is at odds with economist Douglass North's argument
that sustained innovation only began in earnest after the establishment of
intellectual property rights to raise the private return for innovation. See
DOUGLASS G. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY 164-
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Restricted access to technological advancements in the cotton
industry similarly delayed development and dissemination of
industrial technology. During the ascendance of the British cotton
industry in the eighteenth century,
[t]he flow of technology within and among British firms
was primarily managed by informal private arrangements
and not the patent system .... [I]n the eighteenth century
only 44 percent of 174 key inventions in the textile industry
were patented. Indeed a key upsurge in innovation occurred
after the patents of the most famous innovator, Arkwright,
were broken.
75
These examples underscore the danger that "exclusive control of
intellectual property rights grant[ed] to pioneers may stifle the
invention of improvers."
II. KEY MOMENTS OF CONTESTATION AND SETTLEMENT
A. Arkwright and the Spinners
The story of Richard Arkwright, a developer of commercially
successful textile machinery and water-powered spinning
technology,77 highlights the tension within intellectual property
between private reward and the public good. His story also
demonstrates how property rights create winners and losers and
reveals significant political and economic battle lines over what is at
stake. At the time Arkwright sought patents for his inventions,
British patent law did not provide for stringent patent examinations.
Patents were scrutinized only when infringement cases reached the
courts.78 Therefore, inventors concerned about infringement often
drafted their patent specifications vaguely so that their inventions
66 (1981). He attributes the delay in the dissemination and further exploitation
of Watt's invention to the inadequate development of companion technologies,
rather than to the power of withholding property and the social inefficiencies
generated by such withholding. Id. at 162-64. However, the development of
companion technologies was itself stifled by the relatively limited diffusion of
engines utilizing Watt's technology. MAY & SELL, supra note 44 (manuscript
at 57).
75. Porter, supra note 53, at 266.
76. Lemley, supra note 30, at 131.
77. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 19-20.
78. MacLeod, supra note 69, at 9.
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would be impossible to duplicate. 79 As Professor Christine MacLeod
states, "[p]atentees tried to steer a course between the Scylla of
exactness that risked allowing pirates to escape prosecution through
a minor variation and the Charybdis of too general a claim that
would lead to the patent's invalidation."
80
Because Arkwright was concerned with patent infringement, he
too filed vague patent specifications. 81 However, when he pursued
his first infringement case in 1781, the court found his patent invalid
because, rather than disclosing his invention, he "did all he could to
hide and secrete it."
82
Arkwright pursued another patent infringement suit in 1785
against his neighbor, Peter Nightingale. 83  Nightingale's defense
again focused on whether a competent person could build the
machine based upon the patent specifications. 84 This time, the court
ruled in Arkwright's favor.85 This victory actually made Arkwright's
situation worse, however, because it caused the Lancashire spinners8
6
to fear the prospect of paying Arkwright licensing fees to use his
equipment. 87 That same year, the spinners sought to annul the
verdict. 88 According to Professor Barrington Moore:
The legal representative of the Lancashire spinners took the
high moral ground of public and national interest.
Arkwright's patent represented a monopoly. Legal
recognition of the patent would enable Arkwright, already a
rich man, to choke off the livelihood of thousands of hard-
working people. Moreover, it would in time destroy the
flourishing British textile industry in which England already
led the world.89
79. See id.
80. Id. at 7.





86. The Lancashire spinners were workers who lived in Lancashire England
and earned their living spinning cotton into cloth.




The court found that the right to labor and continued economic
hegemony outweighed the right to monopoly, and the spinners
ultimately prevailed. In the end, Arkwright lost both of his patents
due to ambiguous specifications and spent 1,119 pounds 90 in
litigation fees.
9 1
Arkwright's story demonstrates that property holders did not
automatically win, and that courts tried to balance diverse public
goals. Historically, intellectual property rights were considered
grants of privilege and were explicitly recognized as exceptions to
the rules against monopolies. 92  Recognizing these rights as
privileges underscores their temporary and unstable nature: what
may be granted may be taken away when such grants conflict with
other important social goals. By pitting the right to labor and
continued British hegemony against the right to monopoly, the case
of the Lancashire spinners illustrates how a shift in public policy can
affect the distribution of property rights.
93
The outcome of this case also set into motion another political
dynamic that energized the activities of patentees. Significantly,
Arkwright's losses in court mobilized a broad quest for stronger
patent rights. 94 In 1785, after the court cancelled Arkwright's second
patent, a number of patentees and a "putative Patentees' Association
[met and resolved] to unite in defense of their respective rights and to
agree upon a mode of application to Parliament for the better security
of their inventions." 95  Manufacturers were most concerned with
protecting their escalating investments in factory production.
Professor MacLeod maintains that:
90. In modem U.S. Dollars this sum equals approximately $124,000. See
www.eh.net/hmit/exchangerates/ (In 1800, £.22 (British) equivalent to $1
(United States). Thus, £1,119 (British) equaled approximately $8,686.);
http://oregonstate.edu/dept/pol-sci/fac/sahr/sahr.htm (conversion chart to
modem U.S. Dollars).
91. See David Jeremy, Patents and Technology Transfer Between Nations:
1790-1851: Help, Hindrance, or Irrelevance: Lessons from History, ESRC
Research Seminar Series: Intellectual Property Rights, Economic Development
and Social Welfare: What Does History Tell Us? 6 (April 26, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
92. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 478-79.
93. See MOORE, supra note 1, at 20-2 1.
94. See MacLeod, supra note 69, at 18.
95. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[T]heir interests. .. shaped the patent system... in the two
centuries before 1852 and arguably beyond .... Top of
their agenda was the security of their intellectual property
and the development of institutions that would decrease the
risk and uncertainty of managing it-primarily a cheap and
fast way to settle disputes over the ownership and
infringement of patents.
96
B. The Nineteenth Century: Diversity in Law
The nineteenth century witnessed considerable fomentation and
controversy concerning copyright, and particularly patent
protection.97 The intellectual property landscape of the nineteenth
century was a patchwork of diverse national laws and approaches to
intellectual property regulation.98 As a matter of public policy, most
states had adopted intellectual property policies to encourage the
migration of useful inventions to their territory and to facilitate the
reading public's access to an extensive range of published
materials. These policies included introductory patents,
compulsory licensing, working requirements, differential treatment
for citizens versus foreigners, and by contemporary standards, weak
or lax intellectual property protection.° 0
For instance, the British designed their early patent system to
introduce foreign technologies to the kingdom. Therefore, they
granted monopoly privileges not to inventors, but to those who
brought inventions into public knowledge.' 0' By contrast, the
Americans established their patent system to provide incentives for
domestic innovation while denying protection to foreign
technology. 102 American policymakers also designed their copyright
96. Id.
97. See Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 1 (1950) (patent); JOHN
BRArTHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BuSINESs REGULATION 58-59
(2000) (copyright).
98. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 2-3.
99. Edward Beatty, Patents and Technological Change in Late
Industrialization: Nineteenth-Century Mexico in Comparative Context, 24
HIST. TECH. 121, 123-32 (2002) (providing comparative analysis of patent law
in the nineteenth century).
100. See id.
101. Jeremy, supra note 91, at 6.
102. See id.; Beatty, supra note 99, at 126-27.
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policy to promote learning, public access, and protection of the
public domain. 103 In general, innovators tended to seek higher levels
of intellectual property protection while imitators and technological
"latecomers" sought maximum access to intellectual property at
minimal or no cost.1
0 4
The British dominated the first industrial revolution, roughly the
1780s-1840s, with their mining and steam engine technology and
with the mechanization of the textile industry.'0 5  Patents did not
play a major role in the emergence of the cotton industry, however,
partly due to the sector's initial organization. 10 6  As Professor
MacLeod points out:
[T]he diffusion of a manufacture over a wide area, . . . often
in remote cottages, made enforcement very difficult ....
[After 1770] the removal of cotton and worsted spinning
into the factories prompted an upsurge in patents in those
sectors. Not only was a patent easier to police in a factory-
based industry, but it was also potentially more valuable as
these industries grew exponentially.1
0 7
Also, until 1852, British administration of patent law discouraged
patent application. Patentees faced a cumbersome bureaucratic
maze, high costs of securing and defending patents, and deep
103. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning
the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 918 (2003).
104. This was not the case in every instance. As Professor MacLeod writes:
In the wake of bitter resentment against Watt's patent for the separate
condenser, Cornish engineers turned their back on the patent system:
Cornwall's share of patents for steam-related inventions fell to under
one percent of the national total in the period 1813-52. The start of
this period saw Richard Trevithick and Arthur Woolf erecting
(unpatented) high-pressure steam-engines in Cornish tin and copper
mines, where high coal prices made thermodynamic efficiency of
particular concern. It also witnessed the launch of a monthly journal,
Lean's Engine Reporter, by a group of mine managers with the
intention of discovering and disseminating best practice techniques.
This publication was fundamental to the practice of collective
invention in the Cornish mining industry, which approximately
doubled the 'duty' of high-pressure engines in a quarter of a century.
Macleod, supra note 69, at 16.
105. See id. at 4-5.
106. See id. at 13.
107. Id. at 13.
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uncertainty that deterred many from pursuing infringement
lawsuits.
0 8
In contrast, France had a well-developed patent system. 0 9 The
French system, established in 1791, included patents of introduction,
prohibited French patentees from patenting abroad, and included a
two-year working requirement. " 0 During the Napoleonic invasion in
1811, the French imposed their patent system on Spain."' Spanish
rulers modified it slightly in 1820 and 1826, but the basic contours
remained the same."T2 Thus Spain's system resembled "the first
French tradition and, in general of follower and latecomer countries
whose governments attempted to develop processes of innovation,
modernization and economic growth over and above intellectual
property rights."' '
13
In the mid-1830s, and between 1849 and 1878, the Spanish
government actively blocked numerous invention and introduction
patents that failed to meet the working requirement. 114 As a result,
between 1826 and 1907, "seventy-five percent of registered
inventions lost their monopoly rights within three years [of the grant
date], transferring that technical information to the public
domain.""11 5 Thus, Spain balanced intellectual property protection
with an express commitment to public access.
Unlike its European counterparts, the Netherlands rebelled
against protecting intellectual property rights. 1 6 The majority of
citizens simply did not view granting such rights to foreigners as
beneficial public policy. 117  Initially, the Netherlands did grant
patents to foreign investors. Between 1860 and 1865, the lion's
108. Id. at 10.
109. See Beatty, supra note 99, at 127.
110. Id.
111. J. Patricio Saiz Gonzalez, The Spanish Patent System (1770-1907), 24
HIST. TECH. 45,48.
112. Id. at49.
113. Id. at 50.
114. Id. at67.
115. Id. at70.
116. See Roger Cullis, Fiat Lex: The Role of the Law in the Early
Development of the Electric Light Industry, ESRC Research Seminar Series:
Intellectual Property Rights, Economic Development and Social Welfare:
What Does History Tell Us? 41 (Apr. 26, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
117. See id.
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share of these patents covered inventions made abroad (at least 124
out of 140 per year). 1 8 However, in 1867, a Dutch pressure group
representing small and medium-sized enterprises successfully
lobbied for the abolition of the Patent Act as an "obstacle to the
growth of industry and prejudicial to the national prosperity.""' 9 The
Dutch abolished their patent system two years later.
120
The Dutch were followers in economic and technical fields.
"[T]he absence of patent legislation gave small companies and those
which were just starting up, protection from the disruption and
expense of litigation and thus improved their chances of survival."'12'
Without having to pay royalties, the Dutch could produce goods
equal in quality to foreign goods at much lower costs. 122 Therefore,
they did not reinstate their patent system until 1912.123 Likewise, the
Swiss had virtually no patent law between 1850 and 1907.124 During
this time they freely imitated, copied, or modified others'
inventions.
1 25
The U.S. patent laws of 1790 and 1793 offered strong rights to
citizen inventors. 126 Only inventors, not "introducers," could obtain
patents, and using the system was inexpensive in order to encourage
broad participation. 127 Until 1908, U.S. law also included working
requirements. 128 "Foreigners and foreign inventions were ineligible
for US patents until 1836 and were burdened thereafter by higher








123. See ERiC SCHIFF, INDUsTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS:
THE NETHERLANDS, 1869-1912; SwrrZERLAND, 1850-1907, at 77-81 (1971).
124. Switzerland enacted its first national patent law in 1888. However, the
law's many limitations led to its modification in 1907. For a more detailed
explanation of the history of Swiss patent law, see Dominique Ritter,
Switzerland's Patent Law History, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 463,464 nn.6-7, 470-79 (2004).
125. Id. at 465.
126. Beatty, supra note 99, at 126.
127. Id.
128. Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property
Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2221 (2000).
129. Beatty, supra note 99, at 126-27.
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Discrimination against foreigners was a common policy because
it served the public interest by encouraging technology transfer.
130
As Professor David Jeremy notes, "if both citizens and aliens were
denied the possibility of a patent for introducing a foreign invention,
foreign inventions could be introduced to America without the
additional cost of the inventor's monopoly rights. The USA
therefore had access to the world's technology at a lower cost than
other nations." 131 The asymmetry between British and American
patent laws favored "inventors in the developing, follower, economy
of the USA, rather than the more industrialised, leading economy of
Britain."
' 132
Britain and the United States experienced considerable friction
over copyright policy as well. British authors and publishers
complained of widespread "piracy" of British books abroad.
133
Reprinting foreign books was perfectly legal in many countries. In
fact, reprinting texts by popular British authors was a thriving
industry in America. 134 For example, in 1843 an American copy of
Dickens' novel A Christmas Carol cost six cents, whereas a British
edition cost the equivalent of two dollars and fifty cents. 135 The
British book trade recognized that piracy reduced potential profits
and eliminated major export markets for legitimate British
editions."' In the 1830s, British and American authors
unsuccessfully lobbied the U.S. government to establish American
recognition of foreign.copyright claims. 137 American authors wanted
this recognition due to U.S. publishers' predilection for publishing
uncopyrighted British works instead of protected American works.
138
American authors appealed to Congress "to encourage American
letters by preventing cheap reprints of unauthorized British texts."'
139
130. See id. at 127.
131. Jeremy, supra note 91, at 6.
132. Id. at 7.
133. See JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY AND POLITICS: A HISTORICAL
STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 154 (1994).
134. See Hesse, supra note 5, at 40-41.
135. Id. at41.
136. FEATHER, supra note 133, at 154.
137. See Hesse, supra note 5, at 41.
138. Thomas B. Nachbar, Constructing Copyright's Mythology, 6 GREEN
BAG: AN ENTERTAINING J.L. 37, 45 (2002).
139. Hesse, supra note 5, at 41.
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American publishers prevailed, however, and employed the
discourse of the public interest in defense of their position. 140 A
prominent Philadelphia publishing house sent the following appeal to
Congress in 1842:
All the riches of English literature are ours. English
authorship comes to us free as the vital air, untaxed,
unhindered, even by the necessity of translation, into the
country; and the question is, shall we tax it, and thus impose
a barrier to the circulation of intellectual and moral light?
Shall we build a dam to obstruct the flow of the rivers of
knowledge?
141
In short, U.S. policy reflected the utilitarian justification of the
public interest. As a developing country and an importer of "literary
and scientific creations," the United States sought to retain the right
to "appropriate the ideas, literary creations, and scientific inventions"
of the leading countries. 14 2 By contrast, net exporters such as France,
England, and Germany invoked a "natural-rights doctrine as a
universal moral and economic right enabling authors to exercise
control over their creations and inventions and to receive
remuneration." 143 By the early eighteenth century, Europeans had
negotiated an extensive network of bilateral copyright agreements
which led to a growing demand for codification in an international
treaty.144 Americans were reluctant to participate in such an
undertaking because they did not share the European perspective on
copyright protection until the late 1880s.
145
C. 1850-1875: A Key Settlement of the Patent Controversy
Between 1850 and 1875, "a controversy raged between those
seeking to defend the protection of innovation and invention through
the patent system, and those contrasting this protection with the
needs and demands of an international system of free trade."'146 This
controversy reflected the tension between free trade and intellectual
140. Id.
141. Id. (quoting AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 77 (1960)).
142. Id. at 40.
143. Id.
144. MAY & SELL, supra note 44 (manuscript at 178).
145. Hesse, supra note 5, at 40-42.
146. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 483-84.
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property. It also reflected the inherent tension in intellectual
property rights highlighted at the outset of this Article.
Free trade advocates criticized the monopoly aspect of
intellectual property. 147  Those who sought to abolish the patent
system tried to undermine it by characterizing invention as social,
objective, and a product of technological change. 148 Using numerous
examples of simultaneous inventions to buttress their case, they
argued that "no one either merited the reward of a patent or needed
the incentive of a patent to invent."'
149
Opposing groups and committees joined forces to protect the
rights of inventors. 150 Patent lawyers, engineers, and large
companies, who stood to gain from continued patent legislation,
mobilized to support patent rights.' 5 ' Not all inventors and
commercial interests supported patents, however, particularly those
who had been disadvantaged by strong patent protection in the
past. 1 52 Thus, in marked contrast to many contemporary arguments,
free trade advocates opposed intellectual property rights as
protectionist devices associated with monopolies and tariffs that
constrained free trade. 1 3 This political dispute was perhaps the last
time free traders would undertake a concerted effort to suggest that
intellectual property rights were illegitimate and fundamentally
inconsistent with free trade. 1
54
Through extensive propaganda supporting the rights of the
patent holder over the infringer and, more importantly, due to the
decline of support for free trade itself, the champions of patent
protection eventually prevailed. 155 The British resolved the "patent
controversy" in 1883 by enacting reforms that increased access to the
147. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 9.
148. See id. at 24-25.
149. MacLeod, supra note 69, at 6-7 (internal citations omitted).
150. See Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 5-6.
151. See Porter, supra note 53, at 264-66.
152. Cf MacLeod, supra note 69, at 12 (describing correspondence of
inventors that indicate they anxiously weighed the expense of patenting against
the growing need to safeguard their rights).
153. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 9, 28-29.
154. For a contemporary statement of this position, see Jason Nisse, WTO
Turned by America into 'Mafia Racket', INDEP. ON SUNDAY (London), May 4,
2003, at Business 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, INDPNT File; see
also JAGDISH BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS: UNSETTLING
REFLECTIONS ON TRADE, IMMIGRATION, AND DEMOCRACY 78-80 (MIT Press
eds., 1998).
155. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 4-6.
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patent system.' 56 Once society came to regard free trade as less of an
overall benefit, opposition to patent protection lost its momentum.
157
"Intellectual property was still seen as a restriction of trade but such
restrictions, provided they served the national interest, were no
longer problematic."'
5 8
In the coming century, this frank recognition of potential
conflicts between international trade and intellectual property "would
[virtually] disappear from mainstream discourse." 159 Although one
controversy disappeared from center stage, an equally contentious
one took its place. "[T]his period marked the full development of the
discourse justifying [intellectual property rights] as an acceptable and
legitimate form of monopoly.'
160
Henceforth, proponents of patent protection generally regarded
intellectual property as "a direct reward for intellectual labor
(drawing on Lockean logic of labour desert), as part of the
inalienable right of individuals to be associated with their
innovations, or perhaps most clearly, an economic 'necessity' to
ensure the efficient use of resources."'' 1 This idea of knowledge as
property became more widespread and accepted, 162 thus facilitating
increased international commerce in intellectual property-protected
goods and services and the development of multilateral legal
structures to regulate and support such commerce.
163
The justification of patents at the end of the nineteenth century
was a key moment of settlement. Analogizing intellectual property
rights to material property rights rendered ownership of intellectual
property conceptually unproblematic.164 Society's acceptance of the
rights of intellectual property owners allowed for "the development
of the then only emerging global intellectual property rights
structure."' 65 While the truly revolutionary technologies that would
transform the role of knowledge-based assets in economic
156. MacLeod, supra note 69, at 7.
157. See id.
158. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 483.
159. See Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 28-29.
160. Sell & May, supra note 43, at 483.
161. Id.
162. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 9-28.
163. See Sell & May, supra note 43, at 483-85.
164. Id. at 483.
165. Id. at 483-84.
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organization were just on the horizon, the trend toward increased
recognition of intellectual property rights facilitated the emergence
of international intellectual property legal regimes. 166 Waning
enthusiasm for totally unrestricted free trade also paved "the way for
greater co-ordination of cross-border recognition of patent protection
to replace the [existing] territorially delimited provisions .... ,167 As
a result, multilateralism replaced the complex system of bilateral
treaties. 168
D. A Multilateral Settlement
This important shift in ideas about intellectual property was
accompanied by economic and technological changes that combined
to drive the establishment of the multilateral institutions that would
come to govern intellectual property. 169 Intellectual property, both
patents and copyright, became the basis for a new business model for
investment and production. During this period, economic and
technological leadership shifted from Britain to the United States
170
and Germany.' 71 The first industrial revolution had been driven by
the invention of the steam engine, the spinning jenny, machine tools,
and the development of the textile, iron, and shipbuilding
industries. 172 The second industrial revolution, roughly from 1870-
1914, would be driven by chemicals, 1
73 steel, oil, and electricity.174
166. Id. at 484.
167. Id. at 483-84.
168. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 97, at 58-59.
169. Id. at 60.
170. See Cullis, supra note 116, at 31-34.
171. GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE
SCIENCES INDUSTRIES: A TWENTIETH CENTURY HISTORY 75-82 (2003); see
generally CRAIG N. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND
INDUSTRIAL CHANGE: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE SINCE 1850 (1994) (discussing
inequality within the disciplinary boundaries of international relations).
172. FREDERIC PEARSON & SIMON PAYASLIAN, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 79-80
(1999).
173. DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 75-83.
174. Reese V. Jenkins, Patents and Market Dominance: Western Union,
General Electric and Eastman Kodak, ESRC Research Seminar Series
Intellectual Property Rights, Economic Development and Social Welfare:
What Does History Tell Us? 1 (April 26, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) (discussing electricity's role in
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The second industrial revolution witnessed the swift expansion
of world commerce facilitated by the transportation revolution and
the invention of telegraphy.' 75  American economic growth was
fueled by the development of railways, which created a huge
domestic market and facilitated mass production. 176 The new leading
sectors favored the United States' abundance of raw materials' 77 and
Germany's emphasis on scientific education. 17 8 During this time,
large business enterprises with international marketing aspirations
emerged. 1
79
In many cases "myth-making" inventors, such as Thomas
Edison and Werner Siemens, were at the helm. 8 ° Significantly,
these business leaders pressed for higher standards of patent
protection and also sought protection for the fruits of corporate
research and development. 18 1 Additionally, an 1871 U.S. Supreme
Court decision, United States v. Burns,'82 amended the 1791 Patent
Act to permit employment contracts to include a clause requiring
employees to assign patents or other invention rights to the
employer. 183 "Without this change in the effective law, the R&D of
in-house research laboratories and workshops, such as Edison's at
driving the second industrial revolution); Cullis, supra note 116, at 12-18
(same).
175. PEARSON & PAYASLIAN, supra note 172, at 83.
176. MARK RUPERT, PRODUCING HEGEMONY: THE POLITICS OF MASS
PRODUCTION AND AMERICAN GLOBAL POWER 59-63 (1995).
177. Id. at 61-62.
178. DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 75.
179. RUPERT, supra note 176, at 67-69.
180. Jenkins, supra note 174, at 15-33 (discussing Edison's business and
marketing strategies for sale and distribution of the telegraph and electric
light); Cullis, supra note 116, at 15-18 (discussing Edison's business and
marketing strategies for sale and distribution of the electric light); DUTFIELD,
supra note 171, at 77 (discussing Siemens' leadership role in the movement for
stronger patent protection).
181. DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 77 (stating Siemens' concern that British
and American firms would take out patents that would be ineffective in
Germany); PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM:
WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 43-45 (2002).
182. United States v. Bums, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246 (1871).
183. William Kingston, Schumpeter and Institutions: Does His "Business
Cycles" Give Enough Weight to Legislation? 4 (2004), available at
http://www.schumpeter2004.uni-bocconi.it/papers.php?Invin=SELECTbstch
=S (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
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Menlo Park, would have been impossible to finance."'' 84  In
Germany, Werner Siemens, founder of the Siemens Corporation,
went into politics and became a member of the German Parliament in
order to promote the 1877 German Patent Act's passage. 185 Needing
large numbers of employed inventors in its research labs, Siemens
wanted to ensure that the company's patents would belong to the
firm and not to the individual company inventors. 186  As in the
United States, the 1877 German law created this option.'87
In 1873, the Austro-Hungarian Empire hosted a World
Exhibition in Vienna in which American inventors refused to take
part out of concern that their inventions would not be adequately
protected.188 German inventors shared this reluctance. 189 In 1873
the empire adopted a temporary law providing protection for
foreigners to encourage foreign inventors' participation. 190  This
protection would last for the duration of the exposition.' 91
As a result of German and Austrian patent attorneys' and
engineers' intense lobbying efforts, the German government held a
Congress in Vienna in 1873 to address inventors' concerns.
192
Werner Siemens' brother, William, chaired the Congress.' 93 German
participants predominated, and while the majority of the 158
participants were private sector actors, 13 represented nations.
194
The Vienna Congress endorsed international patent protection but
retained support for compulsory licensing.' 95  The overriding
objective was to establish a system in which states would "recognize
and protect the rights of foreign [inventors and] artists within states'
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (internal citations omitted).
187. For an excellent account of the development of the work-for-hire
doctrine in copyright, see Catherine Fisk, Authors at Work: The Origins of the
Work-for-Hire Doctrine, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1 (2003).
188. Cullis, supra note 116, at 31; BRAITHWArE & DRAHOs, supra note 97,
at 59.
189. MURPHY, supra note 171, at 93.




194. Porter, supra note 53, at 265.
195. DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 55.
CONTESTATION AND SETTLEMENT
own domestic borders."' 96 Several follow-up Congresses in 1878
and 1880 further developed the details of an agreement and prepared
a draft convention that became the basis for the 1883 Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (covering
patents, trademarks, and industrial designs). 197 The Paris Convention
created an international union for the protection of industrial
property. 1
9 8
Thus, the patent controversy was ultimately laid to rest with the
victors' perspectives enshrined in a new multilateral treaty-the
1883 Paris Convention. A number of nations also adopted the Berne
Convention of 1886, which covered copyright law. 199  The
underlying principles of these agreements were non-discrimination,
national treatment, and the right of priority.20 0 Nations were free to
pass legislation of their own design, but were obligated to extend
their legislative protection to foreigners of member states.201 These
conventions neither created new substantive law nor imposed new
laws on member states but instead "reflected... a consensus reached
among the states" legitimized by domestic laws already in place.
20 2
Private sector actors, including forty-eight Chambers of
Commerce, played a prominent role at the 1878 Paris Conference,
indicating "the degree to which states were being asked to provide a
regime within which a new level of negotiated private arrangements
could be brought about., 20 3 Additionally, the role of American and
German interests in these deliberations represented a change in
intellectual property preferences from those of followers to those of
196. Ruth L. Gana, Has Creativity Died in the Third World? Some
Implications of the Internationalization of Intellectual Property, 24 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y, 109, 137 (1995).
197. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., BACKGROUND READING
MATERIAL ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 49-50 (1988).
198. Id.
199. Barbara A. Ringer, The Role of the United States in International
Copyright-Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1054 (1968).
200. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 197, at 50 (discussing
Paris Convention); see also Gana, supra note 196, at 137-38 (discussing Paris
and Berne Conventions).
201. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP., supra note 197, at 50.
202. Gana, supra note 196, at 138.
203. Porter, supra note 53, at 266.
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leaders seeking enhanced protection. 204 The anti-patent mood of
Europe vanished as it retreated from free trade.20 5 The Netherlands
had abolished its patent system in 1869 but reinstated it in 1910,
while Switzerland, under pressure from Germany, enacted its first
patent law in 1887.206
Fierce copyright competition between French, Belgian, and
Swiss publishers, and a dense network of bilateral European treaties
inspired a quest for a broader multilateral agreement that would
incorporate the doctrine of national treatment.207  In 1858 Victor
Hugo convened a Congress of Authors and Artists in Brussels that
affirmed the principle of national treatment.2 8  By 1886, ten
European nations agreed to sign the Berne Convention.20 9  The
United States remained excluded from Berne, however, because it
retained a provision in its copyright laws requiring authors to register
their work in Washington D.C. and to send a copy to the Library of
Congress. 210 These terms were inconsistent with Berne Convention
provisions that made acquisition automatic upon authorized
publication in any member state.2 11  Thus, Berne's prohibition
against registration as a precondition for granting a copyright
effectively excluded the United States from the Convention.
2 12
The United States' robust copyright battle represented a
compromise between competition and security. The nineteenth
century copyright battles between Britain and the United States
204. For a fascinating discussion of the evolution of the German position see
Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A Re-evaluation of the International Patent
Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 765, 765-81 (1947).
205. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 97, at 5-6.
206. MacLeod, supra note 69, at 7; see also Kingston, supra note 183, at 5
("The [German chemical] industry financed three referenda in Switzerland
until it got the patent legislation it wanted there to prevent free-riding on its
inventions by local firms .... ).
207. Ringer, supra note 199, at 1052.
208. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 12, 71-72 (rev. ed. 1975) (discussing the
Brussels Congress of 1858).
209. Ringer, supra note 199, at 1054 n.23 (the original European members of
the Berne Union were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom).
210. See generally id. at 1055-59 (discussing the United States' posture
toward Berne Convention requirements).
211. Id. at 1059.
212. Id.
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increasingly pitted two American factions against each other.2 13 "On
one side, trade protectionists, printers' unions and publishing houses,
whose fortunes were rooted in pirating British literature argued
against any international agreement. On the other side, advocates of
indigenous authors allied themselves with partisans of free trade and
international copyright, claiming universal natural rights of
authorship."
214
It was not until the 1880s, in the face of ruinous competition
from new "penny-press" publishing houses in the Midwest, that the
older, East Coast publishing interests changed their tune.215 They
altered their business strategies and their views on intellectual
property because:
They now realized that they would be better positioned than
the new generation of publishers to sign exclusive copyright
agreements with foreign authors that would be enforceable
within the United States. The... Berne Convention...
added further momentum to a shift in... views ....
American theologians, including the Reverend Isaac Funk,
now denounced the "national sin of literary piracy" (which
had allowed him to make his fortune on his pirated Life of
Jesus) as a violation of the seventh commandment.
216
In response to this new attitude toward intellectual property, a
group of publishers formed the American Copyright League in 1884
to press for copyright reform. 217 The United States' exclusion from
Berne prompted the League to push for changes in U.S. law to
conform to the Berne Convention. 218  Southern Democrats bitterly
opposed any effort to open American markets to foreign competition,
however. 2 19 The printing industry also opposed copyright reform
because it "feared loss of work [to foreign competitors if] copyright
in imported books was protected under American law."
220
213. See Hesse, supra note 5, at 41.
214. Id.
215. See id.
216. Id. at 41-42.
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To appease the printing workers' unions, the final compromise
of 1891, the Chace Act, provided that foreign authors could obtain
copyright protection only if the United States published their work
no later than the work was published in its country of origin.22'
Additionally, foreign works "had to be printed in the United States,
or printed from type set in the United States." 222 This so-called
manufacturing clause went directly against the Berne Convention,
2 23
excluding the United States from the agreement until the clause
224expired in 1986. Finally, in 1891 Congress signed an international
agreement with England for reciprocal copyright protection. 225 This
compromise reflected both the security interests of the printers'
unions to retain their manufacturing jobs, and the competitive
interests of the well-established East Coast publishers, and American
and British authors.
E. Thomas Edison: Patents as a Business Strategy
Just as ruinous competition in the late 1880s prompted a
redefinition of the established American publishers' interests in
intellectual property protection, a similar dynamic in electric light
and chemical industries animated a major shift toward stronger
patent protection. In the new business model of the second industrial
revolution, patents played a starring role. For example, "between
1840 and 1910, the annual number of patents [granted in the United
States] increased more than fifty-fold., 226  The rise of large
managerial firms in the chemical and electrical industries, such as
Werner Siemens in Germany and Edison Electric in the United
States, introduced a new way of organizing innovation and attracting
finance capital.227
The story of Thomas Edison's transformation from "Yankee




224. Lee A. Hollaar, Legal Protection of Digital Information, § I.C. (2002),
available at http://www.digitial-law-online.info/lpdil.0/treatise4.html (last
updated June 30, 2004).
225. Hesse, supra note 5, at 42.
226. Jenkins, supra note 174, at 1.
227. Id. at 24-28; DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 77-78.
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stronger patent protection.228 Popular mythology notwithstanding,
Edison was a latecomer to electric lighting.229 Well-known in the
telegraph industry, Edison approached successful telegraph
entrepreneurs to help him establish the Edison Electric Light
Company.230 General Counsel of Western Union, Grosvenor P.
Lowrey, advised Edison to establish "a corporation to finance
research and take out patents [on electric light inventions] .231
Western Union had already pioneered a strategy of patenting and
cross-licensing inventions with competitors in order to secure market
shares.232  With financial support from the President of Western
Union, a major stockholder in the Gold and Stock Telegraph
Company and a partner in J.P. Morgan, Edison set up his company to
"own and license all [sic] Edison's electrical inventions other than
those concerned with telegraphy." 233 Edison's mentors at Western
Union, William Orton and Marshall Lefferts, promoted a business
strategy of market dominance by controlling the fruits of innovation
through acquiring both "existing and future patented inventions."
234
The idea was to maintain control over innovation, manage patents to
create barriers to entry, and prepare patents with broad 
claims.235
"Lefferts taught Edison the business importance of patents and of
'covering the field' with patents and with broad claims within
patents." 236  Lefferts also introduced Edison to patent attorney
Lemuel Serrell who taught Edison to keep scrupulous records for the
Patent Office and for future litigation.
2 37
228. "Yankee Genius" usually refers to the innovativeness and ingenuity of
Americans, especially when it came to inventions. Jenkins, supra note 174, at
21 (describing how Edison's early reputation as a creative inventor has
persisted today, due largely to corporate America's attempts to further the
"myths of 'Yankee ingenuity' and of all technological innovation as
'progress"').
229. Cullis, supra note 116, at 16.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See Jenkins, supra note 174, at 11-12.
233. Cullis, supra note 116, at 16.
234. See Jenkins, supra note 174, at 16.
235. See id. at 29 (describing how Edison's subsequent corporation, General
Electric, paralleled Western Union's strategy of controlling innovation and
creating barriers for competitors).
236. Id. at 17.
237. Id.
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At the same time, the establishment of corporate research
laboratories, such as Edison's in Menlo Park, New Jersey, and
amendments to U.S. patent law in 1871 allowing employers to
require employees to sign over any patent rights in their work-related
innovations, launched a new way of organizing research and
development.2 38 Patent attorneys were central to this new model,
playing key roles as agents of the industrial research system and
campaigners for heightened patent protection.239  Edison was
extremely litigious and used predatory patenting strategies to good
effect. 240 "Between 1885 and 1901, the Edison company" responded
to growing competition by filing over "two hundred infringement
suits ... [and] spending around $2,000,000 on litigation."' Even
when Edison technically lost, litigation costs ran many small
competitors out of business. 42 After Edison's spate of aggressive
lawsuits, competition virtually disappeared.243 By 1893, Great
Britain had only seven producers in the lamp business, not all of
which actually produced lamps.
244
The story of British inventor James Swan illustrates how Edison
effectively absorbed competition through predatory patenting
strategies. Even though Swan invented and exhibited the
incandescent filament lamp, Edison beat him to the patenting punch
by filing a British patent with extremely broad claims.245  When
Swan established a company in Britain to manufacture his lamps,
Edison immediately filed an injunction to stop Swan from infringing
his patents.246  Ultimately, Edison wielded his patent power to
convince Swan to amalgamate the two companies into The Edison
and Swan United Electric Light Company, Ltd.247 Even though
238. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 181, at 40.
239. Id. at 43-45.
240. See Jenkins, supra note 174, at 24-25; see also Cullis, supra note 116,
at 31-32.
241. Cullis, supra note 116, at 36-37.
242. See id. at 35.
243. Id. at 36.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 31-32.




Swan had contributed more innovation to the invention, Edison's
patent enabled him to maintain a monopoly position.
248
The Court of Appeal's ruling in Edison & Swan United Electric
Light Co. v. Holland,249 further strengthened Edison's monopoly
position. 250 In 1885, Edison brought an action against Holland and
several other defendants on the grounds that they had infringed on
two of Edison's patents related to the incandescent lamp.25 The
defendants attacked the accuracy of Edison's broad claims and the
sufficiency of the patent specifications.252 At trial, the judged ruled
that one of Edison's patents was invalid. 53 On appeal, however, the
court upheld the validity of Edison's patent, and "Edison and Swan
United Electric Light Company emerged in an unassailable
position."2 54 The court condemned Edison for "unfair exploitation of
the rules of legal etiquette and avaricious patent claims" to "gain
ascendancy over competitors."
255
At the height of this high-profile case, one outraged
commentator, James Swinbume, decried Edison's tactics and
highlighted the unfortunate consequences of Edison's monopoly:
The first effect of a lamp monopoly will be that prices of
lamps will remain high or go higher, and there will be no
stimulus to improvement in their quality because there will
be no competition. People often grumble at the price of
lamps. Prices have to be high because it takes a long time
to get a factory into working order, as the making of lamps
is new to all the hands, an enormous amount of
experimenting, and that on a commercial scale, is needed
before lamps can be made cheap and well. A factory takes
about two years to get into swing, but after that lamps can
be made very cheaply. The actual labour and material in
practice comes to about fivepence halfpenny per lamp sent
out when made on a small scale. These are the actual
248. Id. at 31-36.
249. 41 Ch. D. 28 (1889).
250. See Cullis, supra note 116, at 34-35.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 34.
254. See id. at 35.
255. Id.
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figures. On the scale of manufacture of a large company
the lamps should be sold at a shilling or eighteen pence.25 6
Today, advocates of access to generic medicines to address the
HIV/AIDS pandemic are making the very same arguments. 257 By
highlighting the gap between the high start-up costs of developing
pharmaceutical drugs and the far lower costs of producing them once
the manufacturing process is up and running, like Swinburne, they
argue that the prices should be lowered to reflect the production
costs.
F. The Rise of the German Business Model and the
Emergence of Patent Cartels
With the development of the German dyestuff industry in the
1860s, a new business model emerged under which professional
research and development departments eclipsed the "inventor-
entrepreneur" system. 58 German industrial policy supported the
development of industry by protecting German companies from
foreign competition and permitting "cooperative inter-firm alliances
to fix prices and rationalize sales networks." 25
9
Beginning in the mid-1860s, German interest groups
representing the chemical industry lobbied hard for patent laws. 6°
While eager for domestic patent protection, Werner Siemens,
industrialist and president of a powerful patent cartel, worried that
British and American firms would take out patents but fail to work
them in Germany.261 The German Patent Law of 1877, therefore,
included a working requirement that allowed the government to
withdraw a patent if the holder did not work the patent in Germany
within three years of the grant date.262 Meanwhile, the debate over
256. James Swinburne, The Edison Filament Case, 19 TELEGRAPHIC J. &
ELECTRICAL REV. 129, 132 (1886).
257. See, e.g., Mark Warner et al., AIDS Drugs and the Developing World:
The Role of Patents in the Access of Medicines, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 683, 697-708 (2002) (remarks of James Love).
258. DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 75.
259. Id. at 76.
260. Id. at 77-79 (explaining how two interest groups, the German Chemical
Association and the German Society for Patent Protection, helped pass the
German Patent Law of 1877).
261. Id. at77.
262. Id. at 78.
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whether patents should cover processes, products, or both divided the
chemical industry.263  In line with the wishes of the German
Chemical Association, the final bill covered processes not
264products. To enable firms to claim patent rights in employees'
innovations, German patent law excluded the term "inventor" in
favor of "applicant. ' '26 5 Thus, German law reflected the chemical
industry's commitment to a research strategy of process innovation
and a marketing strategy of product diversity.
266
German firms' process patents and tacit knowledge further
strengthened their position in the dyestuff industry.267 As with the
Edison firms, German firms realized that strong patent positions, i.e.,
massive holdings, could help block research by rivals and facilitate
market domination. 268  Despite an absence of provisions for
patenting chemical products, German firms took advantage of such
provisions in other countries, including the United States and
Britain.269 They also took advantage of foreign laws, such as those
in the United States (after 1908) and Britain that did not include
working requirements. 27  In 1912, ninety-eight percent of chemical
patent applications filed in the United States were assigned to
German firms but were never worked in the United States.
271
Outraged by this asymmetry, Americans lobbied Congress to abolish
product protection and enact a working requirement. 272  Leading
industrialists such as Edison, however, along with their bankers and




265. See id. at 79.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 79-80 (stating three German firms came to dominate the
chemical industry by using "process innovation as a research strategy" and
protecting their innovations with intentionally deceptive patent specifications).
268. Id. at81.
269. Id. at 82.
270. See id.; Merges, supra note 128, at 2221 ("Fortunately for firms
pioneering the strategic use of patent portfolios, the Supreme Court rejected
the rule disfavoring unworked patents in the 1908 case Continental Paper Bag
Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. In this case, the Court swept aside any notion
that a patented invention must be practiced to justify its initial grant or sustain
its validity.").
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The German business model, organized to conduct large-scale
industrial research, spread rapidly in the first ten years of the
twentieth century.274 German dyestuff producers Bayer and Hoechst
used the model to dominate the pharmaceutical industry before
World War 1.275 They did this by moving into pharmaceutical
production and investing their huge dyestuff profits into research and
development departments. 276 Similarly, U.S. firms such as General
Electric, Westinghouse, AT&T, International Harvester, Parke
Davis, and E.R. Squibb set up research labs. 277 Eastman Kodak set
up its industrial research lab in 1912.278
Following Germany's lead, U.S. firms also established patent
departments that became central players in corporate business
strategies. Firms regarded patents as strategic business assets that
could be used not only to protect inventions but also to raise capital
and force cross-licensing with rival firms.2 79  Corporate patent
departments also policed intra-firm patenting activity. 28  DuPont
earned a reputation for being particularly stingy by preventing its
employees from publishing scientific papers.
28'
Under the German business model, the number of U.S. patents
granted between 1870 and 1911 shot up from 120,573 to
1,002,478.282 In the early days, individuals obtained the majority of
patents, but by the beginning of the twentieth century most went to
large firms.283 Meanwhile, follower states such as Spain saw the
bulk of patents granted between 1878 and 1907 go to foreign, non-
resident firms.284  As Professor Edward Beatty points out, the
dramatic expansion of trade and foreign investment in the last quarter
274. John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property, Corporate
Strategy, Globalization: TRIPS in Context, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 451, 453-54
(2002) (describing the German business model as "large industrial laboratories
linked to equally organized production and sales facilities, all coordinated by
one management structure").
275. See DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 75.
276. See id.
277. Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 274, at 454.
278. Jenkins, supra note 174, at 47.
279. Merges, supra note 128, at 2220.
280. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 181, at 45.
281. See id.
282. Braithwaite & Drahos, supra note 274, at 460.
283. Id.
284. Gonzalez, supra note 111, at 73.
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of the nineteenth century, coupled with the 1883 Paris Convention,
sparked "patent law reforms [that] yielded an increasingly
homogenous landscape in a process that was not complete until the
eve of World War I.",85
Most nations that found themselves increasingly part of the
globalizing economy of the late nineteenth century could
not avoid international pressures to offer patent protection
to foreign inventors. Moreover, domestic elites around the
world... had also largely adopted the liberal arguments
that linked property rights with incentives to invest.
286
Thus, the discourse linking intellectual property rights with liberal
markets had finally triumphed over the skepticism of the patent
controversy of 1850-1875.
During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while Edison
purchased, absorbed, or merged with rivals through predatory patent
litigation, numerous other firms formed cartels by consolidating to
set up cross-licensing, price-fixing and market-dividing
arrangements based around their patents. 287 These patent cartels
played an important role in changing the structure of the economic
market from one of free trade to one dominated by monopolistic
forces.288 "In the period between World Wars I and II, firms joined
international private formalized collaborative arrangements of
unprecedented number and complexity."
289
In 1896 General Electric formed a cartel, the Incandescent Lamp
Manufacturers Association, to control prices and market shares.
2 90
Very few firms remained outside this group.291 The cartel made a
price-fixing agreement with Westinghouse, causing lamp prices to
rise about thirty percent.292 The U.S. bank panic and depression of
1893 left General Electric surrounded by weakened competitors.
293
Taking advantage of the situation, General Electric adopted
yet another monopolistic strategy: it proceeded to acquire its
285. Beatty, supra note 99, at 143.
286. Id. at 132.
287. See Porter, supra note 53, at 266.
288. Id. at 266-67.
289. Id. at 266.
290. Cullis, supra note 116, at 39.
291. Id.
292. Jenkins, supra note 174, at 32.
293. See id.
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competitors under the rubric of the National Electric Lamp
Company-a clever stratagem designed to create the appearance of
an independent company.294  General Electric used its patent-
licensing power to acquire relevant patents, charge higher royalty
rates, prohibit others from exporting without General Electric's
permission, and obtain leadership and control of European cartels.295
Thus, General Electric's "strong patent position gave [it] an initial
near monopoly position from which it then exercised its financial and
market power to maintain a dominant American and world position
until after World War II, decades after its key patents had
expired. ,
296
In Britain, British Thomson-Houston, Siemens, and the General
Electric Company pooled their patents to collectively control the
electric light industry. 297 In 1912 they formed the Tungsten Lamp
Association, which included most of the significant producers in
England. 298 However, three years later the Robin Electric Lamp
Company filed a suit challenging Tungsten's price fixing
arrangements that required the court to consider the public interest. 299
The judge ruled in Tungsten's favor, stating that "although poor
families could not afford electric lighting, there was no evidence that
the price was so high as to be a serious burden to the consumer." 300
In 1925, faced with potentially ruinous competition and stock
dumping just after World War I, the leading European and British
electric lamp producers negotiated the Phoebus Agreement, an
international agreement to control and manage competition.30 1 This
private multilateral agreement required members to divide markets
and exchange technical information and patents.30 2 Patent ownership
induced independent companies "to enter into similar contracts
294. Id. at 33.




299. See id. at 43-44. The Robin Electric Lamp Company acquired a patent
in 1911 for an improved filament lamp. Id. at 43. The cartel offered to
manufacture Robin's lamp, but only if Robin agreed to sell its product at the
cartel's fixed prices. Id. Robin felt that the prices were too high and therefore
prohibitive. Id.




involving quota restrictions and observance of agreed prices." 303 The
Phoebus Agreement remained in force until World War II broke
out.
304
Similar arrangements flourished across sectors during the
interwar period.30 5 The patent system was a central mechanism
facilitating cartel solidarity.30 6  This expansion of international
agreements was not limited to industrial sectors, but also included
mineral and agricultural sectors such as cottonseed oil, corn
products, and heavy minerals.30 7 In 1939 the proportion of goods
sold under cartel control in the United States was roughly "eighty-
seven percent for mineral products, sixty percent for agricultural
products, and forty-two percent for manufactured products."30 8 In
sector after sector, companies subordinated competitive risk to
security and control.
G. Twentieth Century American Ambivalence
The trust-busting movement in the late nineteenth century
United States did little to undermine the industrial cartels.30 9
However, by the end of World War II, U.S. policy turned against
monopolistic strategies, such as organizing cartels, returning to the
principles of weaker patent protection and free competition.
In the late 1800s, farmers lobbied vigorously for controls over
private monopolies, aiming their efforts primarily at consumer goods
industries such as fuel, oil, sugar, matches, linseed oil, and whisky.
31 1
Congress responded by passing the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887
and the 1890 Sherman Anti-Trust Act.3 12 The Acts largely laid
dormant until 1903 when Theodore Roosevelt allocated funds to the
Justice Department for enforcement measures. 313 Consistent with the
farmers' interests, early government anti-trust litigation focused
303. Id.
304. See id.
305. Porter, supra note 53, at 266.
306. Id.
307. See BRAITHWA1TE & DRAHOS, supra note 97, at 41.
308. Porter, supra note 53, at 266.
309. See Cullis, supra note 116, at 50-51.
310. See Porter, supra note 53, at 269-7 1.
311. Cullis, supra note 116, at 50.
312. Id. at 51.
313. Id.
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primarily on the sugar and whisky industries. 3 14 The government
lost six of its first seven cases, however.
315
In 1911 the Justice Department won its first anti-trust suit.3 16
The suit was filed against General Electric and thirty-four other
companies for disguising acquired companies as independent
entities, and entering into price fixing and market-sharing
agreements.31 7 The resulting consent decree required General
Electric "to cease all the alleged practices except 'the use of patents
for market control."'' 318  However, General Electric retained its
patent monopoly and continued to dominate the U.S. lamp
industry.319 Cartel dominance during the interwar period epitomized
the resurgence of economic nationalism and spelled an end to the late
nineteenth century's international liberal economic order.
At the close of World War II, the victors retrospectively
associated economic nationalism with militarism. Pointing to
Germany and Japan as examples, the world began to view economic
nationalism with suspicion. 32 As the strongest victorious power, the
United States took the lead in discrediting economic nationalism and
promoting a new postwar economic order based on multilateralism
and, in response to the Great Depression, a welfare-state version of
economic liberalism. 321 The Bretton Woods institutions including
the International Monetary-Fund (IMF) and World Bank, the United
Nations (UN), the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT),
Marshall Plan, and the European Economic Community (EEC)
institutionalized this multilateral, liberal economic perspective.322
American military occupation of Japan and Germany further




317. Id. at 51-52; see also Jenkins, supra note 174, at 31.
318. Jenkins, supra note 174, at 31.
319. See Cullis, supra note 116, at 52. The consent decree required General
Electric to absorb its subsidiaries into its own business. Id. Nevertheless,
General Electric continued to serve eighty percent of the U.S lamp industry.
Id.
320. See Porter, supra note 53, at 269.
321. See id. at 269-74.
322. JOHN G. RUGGIE, Embedded Liberalism and the Postwar Economic
Regimes, in CONSTRUCTING THE WORLD POLITY: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONALIZATION 62, 78-79 (1998).
306
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corporate governance regimes.323  The United States thereby
delegitimized cartels by associating them with Japanese and German
militarism.324 At the same time, American policy specifically
targeted the horizontal inter-firm cooperation prevalent in Germany
and Japan while pitching its own form of corporate governance-
highly centralized oligopolistic, non-financial corporations
(epitomized by the automobile industry)-as consonant with
freedom, democracy, and competition. 325 As with the rise of the
British cotton industry, however, the patent system actually played a
very minor role in the emergence of the U.S. automobile industry.
32 6
As Professor Tony Porter notes:
A particular target of U.S. policy was the use of the patent
system for constructing cartels. As the tide turned against
cartels the restrictive aspects of the patent system came
under attack. A prominent 1942 proposal by Fortune
magazine called for "abolishing the protection which the
patent system gives to monopolistic practices" and perhaps
even introducing compulsory licensing.
327
These negative attitudes toward strong patent protection and
monopolistic cartels reverberated in American law. From the 1940s
to the 1970s, aggressive anti-trust enforcement and judicial attacks
on patents constituted what Professor David Silverstein has referred
to as the "Dark Ages."328 For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down "tying arrangements," which required purchasers of
patented items to buy corresponding unpatented items, as
inconsistent with the overriding public policy of free competition.
329
"Patent rights increasingly were construed as monopolies, market
power was presumed and these rights were subordinated to the
dominant anti-trust policy."330 The concept of patent misuse reached
323. Porter, supra note 53, at 269.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 270.
326. Id. at 271.
327. Id. at 270.
328. David Silverstein, Patents, Science, and Innovation: Historical
Linkages and Implications for Global Technological Competitiveness, 17
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 304 (1991).
329. SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 66-67 (2003).
330. Id. at 66.
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its zenith in a series of cases in the 1940s, including the Mercoid331
cases and Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppinger Co.332 These decisions
alarmed the patent bar because "misuse became a per se defense that
an infringer could successfully use to escape all liability. In this
respect it proved to be a real windfall for patent infringers. '333
Referring to the doctrine of patent misuse, William Nicoson
complained that "[i]n this welter of opportunity for judicial
absolution, it must be a dull rascal indeed who cannot make piracy
pay.
3 34
This anti-patent environment, characterized by vigorous anti-
trust enforcement and judicial attacks on the scope and validity of
patents, led U.S. businesses to question the economic value of patent
protection.335 More often than not, the courts presumed patents to be
invalid and criticized patentees for setting monopoly prices for
inventions that were already in the public domain. 336 Thus, potential
domestic competitors had little to fear from infringing behavior.337
For example, in 1976 when Eastman Kodak sought to develop an
instant camera to compete with Polaroid, its development committee
issued an internal directive that stated: "Development should not be
constrained by what an individual feels is potential patent
infringement."
33
Since courts frequently invalidated patents and infringers faced
low penalties that usually amounted to paying royalties, U.S.
businesses sought other means of protection from competition, such
as trade secret protection, government subsidies combined with high
secrecy levels (in defense industries), and "voluntary" export quotas
(for the automobile industry).339 Not all industries, however, could
331. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Iv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944);
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)
(sustaining anti-trust liability).
332. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
333. James B. Kobak, Jr., The Misuse Defense and Intellectual Property
Litigation, 1 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH L. 2, 97 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
334. William J. Nicoson, Misuse of the Misuse Doctrine in Infringement
Suits, 9 UCLA L. REv. 76, 92 (1962).
335. Silverstein, supra note 328, at 304.
336. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit.: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 6 (1989).
337. Silverstein, supra note 328, at 307.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 304-05.
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take advantage of these alternative forms of protection, and the
decline of the U.S. patent system from the 1940s through the early
1980s had deleterious effects in sectors such as consumer
electronics. 340 In this environment, "few American businesses were
willing to undertake the financial risks of commercializing new
technologies."3 41 Therefore, while U.S. firms pioneered technologies
such as the transistor, the video cassette recorder, and the integrated
circuit, other countries, most notably Japan, successfully
commercialized these U.S. inventions. 342 In fact, by the late 1960s
Japan came to dominate the consumer electronics market.
343
Congress began to address this lax patent environment by
passing the 1952 Patent Act.344 The Act reflected the wishes of
corporations that had amassed huge patent portfolios and clarified
the notion of patent power as the power to withhold.345 Specifically,
the Act ratified the acceptance of the so-called blocking patent: "the
right to exclude others from use of the invention., 346  This
clarification supported the corporate practice of developing blocking
positions to counter rivals' strength in new technologies and
"overwrote some critical anti-patent decisions of the Supreme Court
from its most virulent anti-patent era (roughly 1930-1948)." 347
Beginning in 1980, a number of Supreme Court decisions began
to signal a new attitude toward patents. In Dawson Chemical Co. v.
Rohm & Haas Co.,348 the Court stated that "[t]he policy of free
competition runs deep in our law[,] ... [b]ut the policy of
stimulating invention that underlies the entire patent system runs no
less deep." 349 For the first time since the A. B. Dick350 case in 1912,
the Supreme Court placed the public policy of supporting patent
340. Id. at 305.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. See id. at 263 n.2, 305 n.171 (comparing Japan's strengths to the United
States's success in aerospace, medical technology, etc.).
344. Merges, supra note 128, at 2221-22.
345. Id. at 2222.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 2223 (internal citations omitted).
348. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
349. Id. at 221.
350. Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 244 U.S. 1, 47 (1912) (stating that a patentee
could extract whatever price or other concession he chose as a consideration
for granting a patent license).
Fall 2004)
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:267
rights on equal footing with the public policy of supporting free
competition, "effectively end[ing] the era of anti-trust dominance
over patent law in the eyes of the judiciary." 351  The rights of
intellectual property owners became more important as they became
increasingly likely to deliver economic and competitive objectives
valued by the U.S. government.
352
The United States' establishment of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) in 1982 also institutionalized a more
pro-patent approach.353 Although the court's creation was animated
by pedestrian concerns such as docket management for a grossly
over-burdened Supreme Court, "[j]ust under the surface,... the
creation of the Federal Circuit had a clear substantive agenda: to
strengthen patents."
354
The proposed creation of the Federal Circuit generated intense
political debate. Advocates of a Federal Circuit argued that such a
court could remedy the problems caused by uneven application of
patent law in various circuit courts. 355 Infringers tended to get better
results in certain circuits, whereas patent holders fared better in
others.356 For example, between 1945 and 1957, the Seventh Circuit
enforced patents nearly four times more often than the Second
Circuit.357 While infringers favored lenient circuit courts, patentees
fought to have their cases heard in the more stringent Fifth and
Seventh Circuits. 358 This inconsistency across circuit courts led to
strategic forum shopping, and rendered the process uncertain at
best. 359  When the Industrial Research Institute surveyed 250
companies engaged in industrial research on the question of a single
patent court, "the vast majority of respondents indicated that the
uncertainty, complexity, and inconsistencies in patent enforceability
eroded the full economic value of the patent. '' 36° Most firms did not
351. Lawrence Kastriner, The Revival of Confidence in the Patent System, 73
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y, 5, 20 (1991).
352. I thank Chris May for urging me to clarify this point.
353. Merges, supra note 128, at 2224.
354. Id.
355. Dreyfuss, supra note 336, at 7.
356. Id. at 6-7.
357. Id.
358. See id.
359. Id. at 7.
360. SELL, supra note 329, at 69.
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consider patents to be reliable incentives for investing in R&D.
36 1
Rampant forum shopping led to costly and protracted litigation, and
the attendant uncertainty "made it difficult for patent attorneys to
advise their clients."
362
An important 1972 Supreme Court decision in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories v. University of Illinois Foundation363 raised the stakes
in patent litigation. The ruling barred "a patent owner from
relitigating patent validity against a new defendant., 364 Therefore, if
a patent owner's case were heard in one of the circuit courts more
lenient toward infringers, the patent owner stood to lose both the case
and the entire patent.365 The patent owner would have no more
opportunities to defend the patent. In the face of these high stakes
and palpable uncertainty, "proponents of a [Federal Circuit] argued
that a single [patent] court would eliminate forum shopping and
inconsistent court rulings, provide more uniformity in patent law,
and thereby facilitate innovation by reducing doubt as to what
protection is available for inventions.
'" 366
Opponents of the Federal Circuit, however, questioned the
extent to which forum shopping was a problem. 367 They expressed
fear that special interest groups might easily capture a specialized
court devoted to patents.3 6 8 If the court consistently were to rule
more strongly in favor of or against patent rights, "the dangers of
concentrated judicial decision-making power could have a negative
impact on the law." 369 Advocates of the Federal Circuit ultimately
won the day, and in the process addressed some of the main
objections that the skeptics had raised. In particular, the CAFC
supporters allayed fears attendant to specialized courts by ensuring
that the court's docket would encompass not just patents, but a broad
range of issues including government contract and labor disputes,
361. Dreyfuss, supra note 336, at 7.
362. SELL, supra note 329, at 69.
363. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
364. Silverstein, supra note 328, at 309.
365. Id.
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technology transfer regulations, trademarks, and tariff and customs
law.
370
The activation of the [Federal Circuit] ushered in a more
vigorous approach to the enforcement of patent holders'
rights. The [Federal Circuit's] decisions have reflected a
more pro-patent approach and have supported higher
damage awards than decisions of previous Courts of
Appeal. The [Federal Circuit] has invigorated the
presumption of validity of patent rights, 'making the
challenger's case harder to sustain' . . . . Under the [Federal
Circuit], references to patents as 'monopolies' have all but
disappeared.37'
Indeed, two Federal Circuit decisions, one in 1983 and another
in 1986, emphasized that courts may issue permanent injunctions
once a patent has been held valid and infringed. 372 "This signaled a
further shift in public policy in favor of patent holders in so far [sic]
as the court ruled that 'public policy favors protection of rights
secured by valid patents,... [and] favors the innovator, not the
copier.' This is a far cry from earlier judicial suspicion of the
monopoly aspects of patent rights. 373
Illustrating this shift is the Federal Circuit's 1986 decision,
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 3 7 4  In that case, the court
found that Kodak infringed Polaroid's patents. 375 The court issued
an injunction and assessed staggering damages against Kodak.376 As
Professor Silverstein notes, "the outcome effectively restored to
Polaroid a virtual monopoly over the United States market in instant
photography." 377 Many regard the Kodak case as the most striking
370. Jack Q. Lever, Jr., The New Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(Part 1), 64 J. PATENT OFF. SOC'Y 178, 204 (1982).
371. SELL, supra note 329, at 69-70 (internal citations omitted).
372. Kastriner, supra note 351, at 13-14 (discussing Smith Int'l v. Hughes
Tool, 718 F.2d 1573, 1581 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
373. SELL, supra note 329, at 70 (quoting Kastriner, supra note 351, at 13-
14).
374. 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
375. Id.
376. Silverstein, supra note 328, at 306.
377. Id. at 307.
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instance of an increasingly pro-patent sentiment in U.S. courts.378
The case demonstrated that "a successful patent infringement suit
can eliminate a competitor from a business, as well as cost the
infringer over a billion dollars in damages and related costs," and
signaled to businesspeople that "infringement is no longer an
economically feasible option."
379
In the 1980s, the United States embraced the conception that
intellectual property protection primarily was a system for protection
and exclusion instead of a public policy to foster competition and
diffusion.380  The structure of global capitalism had evolved to
produce new pressures on the domestic environment for intellectual
property protection.38' The U.S. government's priority to increase
economic competitiveness led it to alter a number of significant
policies and institutions.
382
For example, beginning in 1982 the U.S. Department of Justice
relaxed its antitrust standards and argued "anti-trust laws should not
be applied in a way that hinders the renewed emphasis on
competitiveness. '' 31 The new anti-trust guidelines permitted the
introduction of non-structural factors, such as foreign competition or
the possession of a new technology that was important to long-term
competitiveness. 384 Intellectual property owners have benefited from
this change because "administrators and the courts have adopted the
view that an intellectual property owner has no relevant market
power (in terms of anti-trust) if close substitutes exist for the product
or process. ' 385  Furthermore, institutional changes such as the
creation of the Federal Circuit provided new opportunities for
intellectual property owners to promote their interests.
386
378. Eric Schmitt, Business and the Law: Judicial Shifts in Patent Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1986, at D2.
379. Kastriner, supra note 351, at 15.
380. SELL, supra note 329, at 74.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. (quoting PAUL HOFF, INVENTIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE: PATENT
LICENSING AND THE U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS 19 (1986)).
384. Id.
385. See id. at 73.
386. Id. at 74; see also Dreyfuss, supra note 336, at 26 (stating that
"anecdotal evidence suggests that the [Federal Circuit] is a good court for
patentees").
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Significantly, the policies of this decade galvanized the link
between competitiveness and intellectual property.387 "The Kodak
case brought American jurisprudence full circle, back to the A.B.
Dick philosophy championing protection, exclusion, and
opportunities for extracting monopoly rents. [Kodak] symbolized the
emergence of U.S. patent law out of an era of judicial skepticism that
characterized much of the twentieth century."388 As a result, U.S.
businesses gained renewed confidence in the value of patents as
economic resources.
III. MULTILATERAL SETTLEMENT: PROPERTY
RIGHTS EXPANDED
In the 1980s, American private sector actors led the charge for a
new multilateral settlement embracing their expanded notions of
property rights.389 Just as in times past, leading industrialists, this
time in the pharmaceutical, chemical, software, and entertainment
sectors, lobbied for a reinvigorated approach to intellectual property
protection--one championing security over competition.
390
Commenting on the successful negotiation of the 1994 Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), one
participant stated that private sector lobbyists received ninety-five
percent of what they wanted.391 TRIPS incorporates a notion of
intellectual property rights as a system of exclusion and protection
rather than one of diffusion and competition.3 92 It extends rights
holders' privileges and reduces their obligations.
393
In April 1994, 114 countries and the European Union became
signatories to the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiation's
Final Act.394 The Final Act included numerous agreements such as
the establishment of the WTO and TRIPS. "All of TRIPS is binding
on all members of the WTO .... States therefore have to implement
387. SELL, supra note 329, at 74.
388. Id.
389. See generally id. at 8-9 (describing how private actors used the TRIPS
agreement to pursue their intellectual property interests).
390. MAY & SELL, supra note 44 (manuscript at 233).
391. Interview with Jacques Gorlin, Advisor to the Intellectual Property
Committee, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 22, 1996).
392. SELL, supra note 329, at 74.
393. Id. at 8-9 (providing an overview of the TRIPs agreement).
394. Id.
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a common and enlarged set of intellectual property standards." 395
TRIPS covers all intellectual property rights: patents, trademarks,
and copyrights.3 96 Additionally, it includes provisions on industrial
designs, geographical indications for wine and spirits, integrated
circuits, trade secret protections,397 and sound recordings.398
TRIPS also incorporates the Paris and Berne Conventions
399
with some additional protections.4 0 For example, TRIPS adds
copyright protection for computer programs and databases.4 °'
TRIPS also raises the term of patent protection to twenty years from
the date the application is filed,4 °2 and expands the covered subject
matter to "virtually all fields of technology recognized in developed
country patent systems. 'A 3 It extends patent rights to virtually all
subject matter except plants and animals other than micro-organisms,
including pharmaceutical products, chemicals, and pesticides.4°
TRIPS reaches "deep into national territories in requiring respect for
intellectual property from products destined for domestic markets
such as pharmaceuticals, processes internal to production such as
chemicals, and practices in local agriculture, medicine and education
which were outside of market relations., 40 5 Furthermore, in contrast
to past practice, importation of a good now constitutes "working" the
patent.
"States are obligated to provide enforcement mechanisms both






400. TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 42, at 323-24.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 325.
403. Jerome Reichman, The TRIPS Component of the GATT's Uruguay
Round: Competitive Prospects for Intellectual Property Owners in an
Integrated World Market, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 171,
182 (1993).
404. SELL, supra note 329, at 8.
405. Christopher Arup, Competition Over Competition Policy for
International Trade and Intellectual Property, 16 PROMETHEUS 367, 374
(1998).
406. DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 57-58 (2002).
407. SELL, supra note 329, at 9.
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TRIPS, complainants have access to the WTO's Dispute Settlement
Understanding. 40 8 TRIPS allows for the possibility that infractions in
intellectual property can lead to sanctions on goods, reflecting U.S.
practices under section 301 of the Trade Act.40 9 When the WTO's
Dispute Settlement Body rules on a case, the WTO monitors
compliance to see that the defendants adjust their policies in a timely
manner. 41  In the event that defendants do not comply with the
ruling, "the WTO will authorize the complainant to impose
retaliatory trade sanctions if requested to do so."
'41
The implications of this far-reaching agreement are grave for
less industrialized countries. TRIPS undoubtedly will shape
innovation practices, the location of industry, economic development
and the global division of labor.412 By locking in high standards of
intellectual property protection for countries in much earlier stages of
economic development, it prohibits industrial latecomers from
adopting the very policies that proved to be so successful in countries
such as the United States, Spain, Switzerland and the Netherlands."'
3
As this Article has demonstrated, the industrialized countries
built much of their economic prowess by appropriating others'
intellectual property. TRIPS sharply constricts the range of public
policies that states can adopt to manage intellectual property in a
manner tailored to their specific needs. The TRIPS regime makes
information and technology more costly and less accessible while
vigorously defending the monopoly privileges of rights holders.
414
For example, one World Bank study estimated that the annual benefit
of TRIPS to the United States is about $19 billion in royalties and
licensing fees, whereas South Korea pays about $15 billion each
year."' 5 TRIPS supports an approach to intellectual property that








415. RICHARD NEWFARMER ET AL., GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS
AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 137 (2001), available at http://www.
worldbank.org/prospects/gep2002/gep2002complete.pdf.
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"making it unavailable to future creators. 4 16 States and firms whose
comparative advantage lies in imitation and adaptation stand to lose
under the current regime.
The expansion of property rights combined with American
relaxation of anti-trust enforcement has also facilitated increasing
economic concentration within many prominent sectors. 417 This is
particularly apparent in the life sciences industries.4 8 In a pattern
familiar in history, the life sciences companies emerged and adopted
a new business model in response to declining revenues in the
chemical industry.4 19 As Professor Graham Dutfield summarizes:
During the 1970s, U.S. chemical giants like Dow, American
Cyanamid, Du Pont and Monsanto encountered decreased
profits, higher costs.., and public criticisms stemming
from concern about industrial pollution. They responded by
moving into or increasing their involvement in fine
chemicals sectors like agrochemicals and pharmaceuticals.
These offered much higher profit margins, especially with
the availability of effective monopoly protection through
the patent system.42°
Further, in the agrobiotechnology field "six companies are
responsible for three-quarters of all U.S. patents granted to the top
thirty patent-holding firms. These are Monsanto, Du Pont, Syngenta,
Dow, Aventis and Grupo Pulsar.' '421 Professors Peter Drahos and
John Braithwaite have referred to these life sciences corporations as
"biogopolies" and liken them to the chemical cartels that persisted
through the interwar period.422 Thus, in what Professor Robert
Merges has referred to as "pigging out at the IP trough,,,423 recent
trends threaten to choke off innovation.
416. Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a
Cultural Geography ofAuthorship, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1293, 1332 (1996).
417. See id. at 1346.
418. See generally DUTFIELD, supra note 171, at 135-75 (providing an
historical overview of the role intellectual property rights have played in the
life sciences industries).
419. See id. at 148.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 154.
422. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 181, at 150-68.
423. Merges, supra note 128, at 2233.
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Similarly, copyright protection has expanded as a result of
intensive private sector lobbying and government acquiescence to its
demands. One of the most egregious examples of expanded
protection is the United States' Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 (the Sonny Bono Act).425 In a classic
example of "ex post" protection, 426 the Walt Disney Corporation
lobbied hard for this law because the copyright on the Mickey Mouse
character was set to expire.427  Dubbed the "The Mickey Mouse
Protection Act,"428 this law has been described as "a classic instance
of almost pure rent-seeking legislation., 429  The law extends the
copyright term from the life of the author plus fifty years to the life
of the author plus seventy years.430 In the case of works-made-for-
hire, the term increases from seventy-five to ninety-five years.43'
The law also applies "retrospectively to works subsisting under
copyright, extending their term to a maximum of ninety-five
years."
432
The Sonny Bono Act reflects a dramatic institutionalization of
the romantic notions of authorship sketched out at the beginning of
this Article. Although the corporate animator producing a work-for-
hire hardly evokes the image of the lone artist in the garret with his
quill, the Walt Disney Corporation has benefited greatly from this
romantic notion. As has historically been the case in intellectual
property protection, the choice today is between a future in which
"the most significant aspects of our culture remain perpetually in the
control of a relatively small number of corporations-the publishers
of our day,"433 and one in which clear limits on such rights facilitate
the circulation of knowledge, culture, and information.
434
424. See MAY, supra note 3, at 12.
425. Lemley, supra note 30, at 133-34.
426. See generally id. at 132-48 (describing the new justifications for
intellectual property protection as focusing on incentives to manage and
control existing works rather than on incentives to create new works).
427. Merges, supra note 128, at 2236.
428. Lawrence Lessig, Copyright's First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REv.
1057, 1065 (2001).
429. Merges, supra note 128, at 2236.
430. Lessig, supra note 428, at 1065.
431. Id.
432. Id.




This historical overview suggests that, in many respects,
everything old is new again. There are numerous parallels between
the contemporary era and the world of one hundred years ago. The
current era is characterized by extensive property rights and
economic concentration in leading industrial sectors. 41 To be a
member of the WTO, follower countries must abide by TRIPS
strictures that sharply reduce their policy-making autonomy. 43 6 This
is evocative of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in
which countries began to accept some uniformity in intellectual
property policy.437  Just like nineteenth century nations, modem
countries have been increasingly unable to resist pressure to offer
higher levels of intellectual property protection. Under intense
bilateral economic pressure, developing countries have been forced
to adopt policies that reflect an unproven linkage between
intellectual property protection and incentives to invest.438 Desperate
for foreign investment, many countries have signed onto foreign
investment agreements that require them to offer much higher
standards of protection than are incorporated in TRIPS.439
At the same time, new groups have mobilized to protest this
broad expansion of property rights, just as groups did in the past.
This movement has been most pronounced in connection with access
to HIV/AIDS drugs in sub-Saharan Africa.44  The HIV/AIDS
pandemic thrusts the trade-offs inherent in intellectual property rights
into sharp focus.44 At what point do rights-based incentives to
invest in developing life-saving pharmaceutical products defeat the
very purpose of saving lives? This question animates one of the most
vigorous areas of contestation in contemporary thinking about
property rights.
435. DRAHOS & BRArrHWAITE, supra note 181, at 2-3.
436. Id. at 10-11.
437. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 197, at 49-50.
438. See Peter Drahos, BITS and BIPS: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property,
4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. L. 791, 791-93 (2001).
439. See id. at 793.
440. See id. at 801.
441. See id. (describing doubts of Congressmen about ability of sub-Saharan
African States to meet both intellectual property standards and provide
healthcare).
Fall 2004] 319
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 38:267
While the overall pattern of settlement and contestation is fairly
consistent throughout history, it is also clear that in recent years the
baseline for property rights has moved quite far in the direction of
private reward over public access. Rights which used to be thought
of as privileges and exceptions have superseded obligations. The
balance must be restored and history teaches us that it might.
Characterizing this imbalance as a "one-way ratchet," Professor
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss has proposed incorporating a Bill of
Rights for users into TRIPS.442 This approach could revisit the
possibility of reinstating some of the important instruments that
nearly all countries used in the past, such as working requirements,
compulsory licensing, and differential treatment for foreigners.
Ultimately, a legitimate international intellectual property rights
regime must recognize the variegated constellation of interests and
abilities within and between countries. A one-size-fits-all approach
makes no sense in light of the historical record of economic
development. If nations are to craft policies appropriate to their
levels of economic development and comparative advantages in
innovation and imitation, they must reclaim their autonomy. The
fundamental mismatch between TRIPS as a blanket form of global
governance and the diverse patchwork it purports to replace will
inevitably create friction. As Professor Christopher May states:
Either the global governance of IPRs [intellectual property
regimes] needs to more resemble the previous national
regimes of governance, or states' governments need to
reassert their sovereignty over certain aspects of the
governance of IPRs .... It may be the case that, when the
issues become so politically charged, the notion of an
emergent global polity collapses under the weight, returning
the political response to the national level, where many
governments feel the need to respond to a domestic polity
whose interests are likely to be somewhat different from the
global class of knowledge "owners."
443
442. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II: Should Users Strike
Back?, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 21, 22-30 (2004).
443. Christopher May, Cosmopolitan Legalism Meets 'Thin Community':
Problems in the Global Governance of Intellectual Property, Gov'T &
OPPOSITION LTD. 393, 422 (2004).
CONTESTATION AND SETTLEMENT
This historical survey of intellectual property rights shows that
they have evolved as a result of shifting conceptions of property
rights, technological change, and institutionalization of legal
settlements. The mobilization of private actors has played an
important role in shaping this evolution. Property owners have not
always prevailed, however, as rights of ownership are dynamic,
contested, and socially constructed. Realist theories, which explain
ownership rights solely in reference to power, cannot capture the
complex interplay of ideas, institutions, and material capabilities.
Further, functional accounts of "economic necessity" neglect the
extent to which "necessity" is a highly contested social construction.
Each new round of contestation and settlement produces new
winners and losers. History has shown that depending on how well
mobilized and badly threatened the losers are, they can rise up to
challenge the settlement. Sometimes they prevail, which helps to
redress egregious imbalances. Thus, history provides some hope for
a more balanced future for intellectual property rights.
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